Procedure Under the Ohio Summary Judgment Statute by Wills, Robert L.
PROCEDURE UNDER THE OHIO SUMMARY
JUDGMENT STATUTE
ROBERT L. WILLS*
Ohio Revised Code, Section 2311.041,1 effective November 9, 1959,
authorizes summary judgment procedure in the Ohio courts. It will be
applicable to actions commenced on or after its effective date.2 Senate Bill
58, 103rd General Assembly, which enacts this statute, was sponsored in
the Senate by Senator Thomas F. O'Shaughnessy of Franklin County and
in the House by Representative John E. Kissner of Defiance County.
In a previous article,3 the writer discussed a similar bill in the pre-
vious (102nd) General Assembly which failed of passage. To avoid repe-
tition, reference will be made herein to portions of the previous article.
The only substantial change made in the bill set forth in the previous
article4 was the addition of a provision expressly requiring notice of the
hearing on the motion. There were also some changes in phraseology.
With the enactment of Ohio Revised Code, Section 2311.041, a
useful procedure becomes available in the Ohio courts.5 There will inevita-
bly be a period of adjustment to the summary judgment procedure, as
there is in the case of any change in court procedure. Although the Ohio
statute is more explicit in several respects than summary judgment statutes
and rules in other jurisdictions, it does not attempt to cover every problem
which may conceivably arise. Such an attempt would have made the statute
unduly complicated.
Fortunately, the difficulties of adjustment to the Ohio statute are
lessened by the fact that other jurisdictions have had many years of ex-
perience with summary judgment procedure. Therefore, national encyclo-
pedias, digests, and form books deal with summary judgment procedure.
The topic is classified under various headings, such as "Federal Civil Pro-
cedure," "Judgments," and "Pleading."
As summary judgment procedure has been available in the federal
courts since the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938,
and as Federal Rule 56 was used as a starting point in the drafting of the
Ohio statute,6 treatises on federal procedure may be particularly helpful.
OProfessor of Law, Ohio State University; member of the Judicial Council of Ohio.
1 128 LAWS OF OHIO S. 58.
2 OHIO REV. CODE § 1.20 (1953).
3 Wills, d Proposed Summary Judgment Statute for Ohio, 19 OHIO ST. L. J.
1 (1958).
4 19 OHIO ST. L. J. 7-9.
5 It is available in municipal courts, as well as in courts of common pleas, by
virtue of OHIO REV. CODE § 1901.21, in the municipal court chapter, which pro-
vides in part: "In any civil case or proceeding if no special provision is made
in sections 1901.01 to 1901.38, inclusive, of the Revised Code, the practice and
procedure shall be the same as in courts of common pleas."
6 19 OHIO ST. L. 3. 9.
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TYPEs OF ACTION IN WHICH SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROCEDURE
MAY BE UTILIZED
Under the Ohio statute, summary judgment may be granted in any
civil action, without any restriction as to the nature or kind of action. This
spares the Ohio courts and lawyers the task of interpretation faced in
other states in which, especially under early forms of summary judgment
statutes, summary judgment was available only in specified types of action.7
However, it should be recognized that, while the Ohio statute contains
no limitation as to the kind of civil action in which summary judgment
should be granted, it may properly be granted in any particular action
only when, although an issue of fact is presented by the pleadings, the is-
sue is not a genuine issue. Obviously, such cases are in a minority. In most
cases in which issues are raised by the pleadings, such issues are genuine;
that is, the parties have evidence to support their respective pleadings, and
the conflict between the evidence of the parties must be resolved at the
trial by the trier of the facts, i. e., the jury or a judge sitting without a
jury. In cases in which it is apparent that there is such a genuine issue,
it is a waste of time for a party to file a motion for summary judgment.
However, if counsel for one party has reason to believe that the adverse
party has no evidence to support hs ple-idings, and that the issue presented
by the pleadings is therefore not a genuine issue, consideration may be
given to the possibility of filing a motion for summary judgment.
Experience in other jurisdictions indicates that one of the most fre-
quent types of cases in which summary judgment is granted is a suit for
the purchase price of goods sold and delivered, in which the defendant
files an answer consisting of a general denial.'
Summary judgment is frequently granted in suits on promissory
notes and other negotiable instruments.' In Ohio, the motion for sum-
mary judgment would probably be employed in suits on promissory notes
only when the instrument does not contain a cognovit clause, or when the
cognovit clause for some reason is not effective. Ordinarily, when a note
sued upon contains a cognovit clause, the plaintiff will prefer to
take a cognovit judgment on the note. However, if a cognovit judgment
is vacated, and defendant given leave to answer, either party might there-
after give consideration to the possibility of moving for summary judg-
ment.
In mortgage foreclosure cases, the defendant is sometimes tempted
to file an answer consisting of a general denial, in order to stave off judg-
ment and thereby remain in possession for a substantial period of time.
In such cases, summary judgment is frequently effective. 10
7 19 OHIO ST. L. J. 11.
8 A hypothetical case of this kind, showing the operation of summary judgment
procedure, is set forth in 19 OHIo ST. L. J. 21.
9The original English summary judgment statute was limited to bills of
exchange and promissory notes. 19 OHIO ST. L. J. 5.
10 A hypothetical case of this kind, showing the operation of summary judg-
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Negligence cases in which summary judgment may properly be
granted are exceptional. In most negligence cases, there are genuine issues
of fact. The parties themselves are often witnesses, and their testimony,
as well as the testimony of non-party witnesses, is frequently in sharp con-
flict. In such cases, the affidavits and other evidentiary materials submit-
ted in support of and in opposition to a motion for summary judgment
would clearly establish the existence of a genuine issue of fact, and the mo-
tion would therefore be denied. Thus, in many intersection cases, plaintiff
and his witnesses testify that the traffic light facing the defendant was red
when defendant entered the intersection, whereas defendant and his wit-
nesses testify that the traffic light was green. In such cases, it is useless for
either party to move for summary judgment, as the affidavit in opposition
which will undoubtedly be filed by the adverse party will prevent the
granting of the motion.
There are occasional negligence cases, however, in which summary
judgment may be granted, because of the absence of any genuine issue
as to negligence or contributory negligence. 11
Furthermore, a decisive defense in a negligence action, such as the
statute of limitations, may be the basis for a summary judgment in favor
of the defendant. Such defenses will be discussed infra.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Regardless of the merits of plaintiff's cause of action, the statute of
limitations may be a complete bar. When this decisive defense is asserted
by the defendant, efficient judicial administration calls for the adjudication
of this issue prior to the trial of the other issues, if possible. If this issue
is determined in favor of the defendant, it is unnecessary to try the other
issues. In cases of this kind, the defendant will often attempt to obtain an
adjudication of this issue before trial, but the plaintiff will sometimes pre-
fer to avoid this if possible. In the past, the procedure available in Ohio
to the defendant for obtaining an early adjudication of this issue has not
been completely satisfactory.
If it appears from the face of plaintiff's petition that the action was
not brought within the time limited for the commencement of such ac-
tions, the defendant may raise the defense of the statute of limitations by
a special demurrer, under Ohio Revised Code, section 2309.08(I). This
may result in judgment for the defendant on the demurrer, thus avoiding
a pointless trial. On the other hand, if the defense of the statute of limi-
ment procedure, is set forth in 19 OHIo ST. L. J. 21.
llAn actual Federal Employers' Liability Act case, Wilkinson v. Powell,
149 F.2d 335 (5th Cir. 1945), in which defendant's motion for summary judgment
was granted, is discussed in 19 OHIo ST. L. J. 21-22.
In American Airlines v. Ulen, 186 F.2d 529 (D.C. Cir. 1949), an action for
damages for personal injuries resulting from the alleged negligence of the defend-
ant, the district court granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, and sub-
mitted the question of damages to a jury. The resulting judgment for plaintiff was
affirmed by the court of appeals.
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tations does not appear on the face of the petition, the proper method of
raising the defense is by answer. 2 However, if the defendant raises the
defense by answer, the plaintiff may file a reply raising an issue of fact
with respect to the statute of limitations. Even if the issue is not genuine,
it has, in the past, prevented the disposition of the case before trial. There-
fore, it is not surprising that in this situation Ohio defendants have ex-
perimented with the motion to dismiss, which is without statutory authoriza-
tion. Sometimes the motion to dismiss has been effective, and has resulted
in a judgment for the defendant without trial. In one case, the Ohio
Supreme Court gave a qualified approval to the use of the motion to dis-
miss to raise the defense of the statute of limitations.'" In another case,
decided a few months earlier, the same court held a motion to dismiss in-
effectual, in the particular situation, to raise the defense of the statute of
limitations.'4 With the enactment of the Ohio summary judgment statute,
a clear cut procedure, specifically authorized by statute, is now available
to the defendant who is unable to raise the defense of the statute of limita-
tions by special demurrer. The defendant may now raise that defense by
answer, along with his other defenses, and if the plaintiff by reply raises
a factual issue with respect to the statute of limitations which is not gen-
uine, the defendant may move for summary judgment. There is no longer
any need to use the dubious motion to dismiss for the purpose of raising
the defense of the statute of limitations.
OTHER DEFENSES
In addition to the statute of limitations, there are other defenses
which may be decisive in a particular case, furnishing a possible basis for
summary judgment in favor of the defendant. Examples of such defenses
are the statute of frauds, res judicata, release, and failure to present a
claim to an administrator of the estate of a decedent within the required
time.
DIsTINCTION BETWEEN SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
The Ohio motion for judgment on the pleadings, like the Ohio de-
murrer, always has been and still is limited to the pleadings; that is, the
court in passing on such a motion may consider only facts appearing on
the face of the pleadings. If a demurrer or a motion for judgment on the
pleadings improperly attempts to raise factual issues which do not appear
on the face of the pleadings, it is a "speaking demurrer," or a "speaking
motion," and the court, in passing on the demurrer or motion, must dis-
regard the factual issues thus improperly raised. This rule is not changed
by the Ohio summary judgment statute. Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules
12 Atkinson, Pleading the Statute of Limitations, 36 YALE L. J. 914- (1927);
Atkinson, Re-examination of the Procedural Aspects of the Statute of Limitations,
16 OHIo ST. L. J. 157 (1955).
1 Wentz v. Richardson, 165 Ohio St. 558, 138 N.E.2d 675 (1956).
14 Russell v. Drake, 164 Ohio St. 520, 132 N.E.2d 467 (1956).
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of Civil Procedure provides that
if, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside
the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court,
the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and
disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given
reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent
to such a motion by Rule 56.
However, there is no such provision in the Ohio statutes. Therefore,
if a party to an action in an Ohio state court moves only for judgment
on the pleadings, it would presumably still be improper for the court to
consider matters not appearing on the face of the pleadings.
On the other hand, a motion for summary judgment under Section
2311.041, Ohio Revised Code, is a legitimate "speaking motion." By the
terms of the statute, an Ohio court, in passing on a motion for summary
judgment, is expressly authorized to consider the evidential materials
enumerated in the statute. Therefore, if an Ohio lawyer wishes to invoke
facts not appearing on the face of the pleadings, he should so word his
motion as to make it clear that it is a motion for summary judgment,
rather than for judgment on the pleadings.
Furthermore, the court may grant a motion for summary judg-
ment solely on the basis of the pleadings.' In other words, a motion for
summary judgment will accomplish as much as a motion for judgment on
the pleadings. However, as explained above, the converse is not true; a
motion for judgment on the pleadings will not accomplish as much as a
motion for summary judgment. Thus in Ohio the two motions are not
interchangeable, as they are to a considerable extent in federal practice.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
MOTION TO STRIKE SHAM PLEADING
Although, from the historical viewpoint, the motion for summary
judgment may be said to have developed from the motion to strike a sham
pleading,"C the uncertainties as to the scope of the motion to strike a sham
pleading, and as to the power of the court when passing on such a motion,
led to the enactment of the summary judgment statute. With the avail-
ability of summary judgment procedure, there would seem to be no reason
why an Ohio lawyer should have any occasion to file a motion to strike a
pleading as a sham. Furthermore, in drafting a motion for summary judg-
ment, the inclusion of an application to strike an opposing pleading as a
sham would appear to be redundant, and perhaps confusing.
SUPPORTING AND OPPOSING AFFIDAVITS
The provisions for the use of affidavits are the heart of the summary
judgment statute. Without the use of affidavits, summary judgment pro-
cedure would be no more effective than the motion to strike sham plead-
'
5 Reynolds v. Needle, 132 F.2d 161 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
16 19 OHio ST. L. J. 2-5.
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ings. Nevertheless, summary judgment procedure has been criticized as
"trial by affidavit." Much of this criticism results from the mistaken be-
lief of the critics that a judge, in passing on a motion for summary judg-
ment, decides issues of fact. As previously pointed out, this is incorrect.1"
In passing on a motion for summary judgment, the court merely deter-
mines whether there are genuine issues of fact. If it determines
that there are not, it sustains the motion and enters summary judg-
ment. However, if it determines that there are genuine issues of fact, it
simply overrules the motion for summary judgment. It does not deter-
mine the issues of fact on the motion; the parties have a right to try these
issues in open court, before a jury or a judge, as the case may be.
The requirements for the summary judgment affidavits are set forth
in the first sentence of paragraph (D) of the statute:
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is compe-
tent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Thus the affidavits differ from pleadings in at least four respects:
(1) They shall be made on personal knowledge.
(2) They must be sworn to positively."8
(3) They shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evi-
dence. Hearsay, conclusions, ultimate facts, and so on, are not permissible
in affidavits.
(4) They shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to
testify to the matters stated therein.
With reference to the requirement that the affidavits shall set forth
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, it should be particularly
noted that the language of the affidavits is considerably more specific than
that of pleadings. A pleading states ultimate facts, but a summary judg-
ment affidavit states evidence. It has been said that an affidavit on a motion
for summary judgment should be phrased similarly to the testimony of
the witness in narrative form, that is, it should be phrased as specifically
as if the witness were testifying orally in narrative form. As a New York
judge put it:
"Let the affidavit follow substantially the same form as though
the affiant were testifying in court.'
' x9
Legal argument should be set forth in memoranda; it has no place in
an affidavit.2"
Examples of the phraseology employed in summary judgment af-
fidavits may be found in form books.21 .
17 19 OHIo ST. L. J. 14-17.
18 Onio REv. CODE § 2309.49 provides that the verification of a pleading
"shall be sufficient if it states that the affiant believes the facts stated in the
pleading to be true."
19 SHIENTAG, SUMMARY JUDGMENT 49 (1941).
20 Porter v. American Tobacco Co., 7 F.R.D. 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
21 See, e.g., 4 WEsT, FEDERAL Fopms §§ 4727, 4728, and 4729 (1952), and 4
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If an affidavit contains some inadmissible evidence, the court may dis-
regard it, or, if no objection is made, the court may apparently regard
the objection as waived, and consider the evidence in passing on the mo-
tion. In view of the latter possibility, it would appear to be good practice
for a party to file a motion to strike the inadmissible evidence, if he wishes
to have it excluded.22 The Ohio statute, like Federal Rule 56, does not
deal expressly with this problem.
2 3
MOVING FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The preparation of a motion for summary judgment ordinarily pre-
sents few problems. 24 The wording of the motion should indicate clearly
that it is a motion for summary judgment, and not for judgment on the
pleadings or to strike the opponent's pleading as a sham. Reference in the
motion to Ohio Revised Code, Section 2311.041 may also be desirable.
Reference in the motion to the specific affidavits and other evidentiary ma-
terials offered in support of the motion may be desirable. Such supporting
materials should be filed at the same time as the motion.
Notice of the filing and the date of the hearing must be given to
the adverse party or his counsel at least five days prior to the hearing, un-
less such notice is waived.
If opposing affidavits are filed by the non-moving party, counsel for
the moving party may consider filing a motion to strike inadmissible mat-
ter from such affidavits.25
Normally, affidavits in support of the motion which merely impeach
the witnesses of the non-moving party are ineffective, as they merely
raise issues of credibility, which cannot be determined by the court in pass-
ing on a motion for summary judgment.26
Oral or written argument or both should be presented to the court in
support of the motion, in accordance with the method of hearing em-
ployed by the court.
OPPOSING A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
When a motion for summary judgment is made by a party, the first
task of counsel for the adverse party is to determine whether the affidavits
or other evidential materials filed in support of the motion, if unopposed,
are sufficient to support the motion and authorize the grant of summary
judgment in favor of the moving party. If the affidavits submitted by the
WINSLOW, FORMS OF PLEADING AND PRACTICE §§ 5592, 5593, and 5594 (3d ed.
1934).
22The opinion by the late Judge Nevin in Ernst Seidelman Corp. v. Mollison,
14 FED. RULES SERVICE 56e.1, Case 4, 10 F.R.D. 426 (S. D. Ohio, 1950), is a rul-
ing on such a motion.
23This problem is discussed in 6 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 2334-2336 (2d
ed. 1953).
24 15 AM. JUR. PLEADING AND PRACTICE FORMS Number 15:1558 (1958) is a
general form of motion for summary judgment.
25 See note 22, supra, and accompanying text.
266 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 2332 (2d ed. 1953).
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moving party are clearly insufficient, counsel for the adverse party would
not be required to file opposing affidavits, and would only file a motion to
strike the affidavits, or portions thereof (if appropriate), and oppose the
motion by oral or written argument or both.
Usually, however, it would be dangerous for the adverse party to
make the assumption that the affidavits submitted by the moving party are
insufficient. If they are in fact sufficient, the burden of going forward is
cast upon the adverse party. This is the fundamental principle of sum-
mary judgment procedure. It is explicitly formulated in the last two sen-
tences of paragraph (D) of the Ohio statute:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported
as provided in this section, an adverse party may not rest upon
the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but his response,
by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this section, must set
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appro-
priate, shall be entered against him.
Therefore, in most cases, counsel for the adverse party should, if
possible, file opposing affidavits or other evidentiary materials contradicting
the affidavits filed in support of the motion. The adverse party's affidavits
may also properly impeach as well as contradict the moving party's affida-
vits, as impeaching affidavits may raise a genuine issue of fact which would
require the court to overrule the motion for summary judgment." Coun-
sel for the adverse party may consider filing a motion to strike inadmis-
sible matter from the affidavits filed in support of the motion.
28
There are situations where it would be unjust to render summary
judgment even though the adverse party fails to oppose the motion with
adequate affidavits or other evidentiary materials. Paragraph (E) is de-
signed to meet these situations:
(E) Should it appear from the affidavits of a party op-
posing the motion for summary judgment that he cannot for
sufficient reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to
justify his opposition, the court may refuse the application for
judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or discovery to be had or may make such other order
as is just.
Thus, if the facts are exclusively within the knowledge of the moving
party, or if the adverse party has been unable to ascertain the identity or
location of a witness, or has been unable to obtain an affidavit from him, or
if the adverse party can present the evidence adequately only by examin-
ing the witness in open court, where his demeanor may be observed, the
court may grant the relief authorized by paragraph (E). It should be
noted, however, that the adverse party must show affirmatively by his own
affidavits that he is entitled to the relief authorized by paragraph (E).
27 See note 26, supra.
28 See note 25, supra, and accompanying text.
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It should also be noted that affidavits under paragraph (E) perform
a function entirely distinct from that performed by affidavits under para-
graph (D).
Affidavits referred to in rule 56 (f) [corresponding to para-
graph (E) of the Ohio statute] are not evidentiary but are in
the nature of an excuse setting forth reasons why the opposing
party is presently unable to produce evidentiary affidavits essen-
tial to justify his position.29
In some cases, counsel for the adverse party may believe that not
only should the motion of the moving party be overruled, but that sum-
mary judgment should be rendered in favor of his client. While some
courts have held that the court, in passing on a motion for summary judg-
ment, has power to render summary judgment against the moving party,
without any cross motion by the adverse party, there is authority to the
contrary,30 and safe practice would dictate the filing of a cross motion for
summary judgment by the adverse party.3 1
ORDER SPECIFYING FACTS THAT ARE WITHOUT CONTROVERSY,
WHEN MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DENIED
Even when a motion for summary judgment is denied, it may be
possible for the court, under paragraph (C), to ascertain that there is no
controversy as to certain material facts, and accordingly to make an order
on its journal specifying the facts that are without controversy. Thus, even
though a trial is necessary, the issues may be considerably narrowed.
An order specifying the facts that are without controversy has some-
times been referred to as a "partial summary judgment." This term is a
misnomer, as the order is not a judgment at all. It is not immediately
reviewable.
DISCRETION OF THE COURT
As stated supra, the summary judgment statute does not attempt to
cover every conceivable problem which may arise. Necessarily, some mat-
ters must be left to the discretion of the court. Thus, while paragraph (B)
requires at least five days notice of the hearing, a court might require a
longer time.
"The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by
depositions or by further affidavits." Paragraph (D). Continuances may be
necessary when this is done.
Paragraph (E) gives the court considerable discretion in handling
the situations referred to in that paragraph. Such discretion is necessary,
due to the variety of the situations of this kind which may arise.
29 Note, Civil Procedure-Summary Judgment Under the Federal Rules-
Movting Party with all the Information, 41 IowA L. REV. 453, 455 (1956).
3 0 Annot., Court's po'wer, on motion for summary judgment, to enter judg-
ment against movant, 48 A.L.R.2d 1188 (1956).
31 Annot., Proper procedure and course of action by trial court, 'where both
parties move for summary judgment, 36 A.L.R.2d 881 (1954).
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APPEAL
In Ohio, only judgments and final orders are reviewable by the
Court of Appeals. 2 A summary judgment, like any other judgment, is
appealable."3 Hundreds of summary judgments in the federal district
courts have been reviewed as final judgments.3 4 However, an order over-
ruling a motion for summary judgment seems dearly not to be a final
order, and is therefore not appealable.3 "
A summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff on the issue of liability
alone, under the last sentence of paragraph (B) of the statute, is expressly
stated to be interlocutory in character. Therefore, it would not be imme-
diately reviewable. If, however, after trial of the issue of damages, final
judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff, an appellate court, in re-
viewing such final judgment, might reverse for error in the entry of the
interlocutory summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
Likewise, if a court in passing on a motion for summary judgment
does not render a summary judgment on the whole case, but does, pur-
suant to paragraph (C) of the statute, make an order specifying the facts
that are without controversy, such an order is not a final order, and there-
fore is not immediately reviewable."0 If, however, after trial, a final judg-
ment is entered, an appellate court, in reviewing such final judgment, un-
doubtedly has the power to reverse for error in the entry of the order
specifying the facts that are without controversy.
If an appeal from a summary judgment is contemplated, separate
findings of fact and conclusions of law, under Ohio Revised Code, Sec-
tion 2315.22, are not appropriate, as the court does not determine issues
of fact in passing on a motion for summary judgment.
In taking an appeal on questions of law from a summary judgment,
safe practice dictates filing a bill of exceptions pursuant to Ohio Revised
Code, section 2321.05, containing all the affidavits and other evidentiary
materials submitted to the court on the motion for summary judgment.
It could not safely be assumed that such papers, even if filed with the
Clerk, constitute "original papers" within the meaning of Ohio Revised
Code, Section 2505.08, in view of the previous holdings of the Ohio
courts that many kinds of affidavits are not "original papers."
'37
32 OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 6.
33 6 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 2315 (2d ed. 1953).
34 There was no general provision for the review of interlocutory orders in
the federal courts until the Interlocutory Appeals Act of 1958. 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (b),
72 Stat. 1770 (1958).
35 Marcus Breir Sons, Inc., v. Marvlo Fabrics, Inc., 173 F.2d 29 (2d Cir.
1949).
36 Leonard v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc., 130 F.2d 535 (7th Cir. 1942).
37 See, e.g., Willett. Admr., v. New York Central R. R., 73 Ohio App. 59,
54 N.E.2d 317 (1943).
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